THE FIGHTING lasted less than two weeks, but there was no shortage of explosions. By the end Hamas, a Palestinian militant group, had fired some 4,000 rockets at Israel. Most were intercepted by Israel’s missile defences. Israel responded with hundreds of air strikes on Gaza, a cramped enclave ruled by Hamas, which had no shield. More than 200 people were killed, all but 12 of them Palestinian. The battle began to wind down on May 20th; a ceasefire came into effect before dawn the following morning. Who knows how long the calm will last?

Fighting between Israel and Hamas has become almost routine. Since the Islamist group grabbed control of Gaza in 2007, the two sides have fought four wars and several smaller battles, costing thousands of lives (again, mostly Palestinian). The spark for the latest outbreak came in Jerusalem—but were it not Jerusalem, it would have been some other cause. Israel and Hamas are stuck in a perpetual crisis, trapped by the logic of war, which dictates that they keep going through the same motions.

Start with Hamas, which sees fighting “the Zionist invaders” as its raison d’être. Its campaign of suicide-bombings in the 1990s and 2000s bears much responsibility for destroying the Oslo peace accords. Because of its incessant attacks, Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005. The group expelled Fatah, its Palestinian rival, two years later. Today most Gazans see Hamas as authoritarian and corrupt. Unable to point to any achievements, it instead blames Israeli aggression and poses as the one true defender of the Palestinian cause. It had no plan to attack Israel; it merely saw an opportunity to assert itself after Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian president and leader of Fatah, indefinitely postponed legislative elections.

Hamas’s attacks are futile: its rockets inflict relatively little damage. But Israel feels it has to respond. “If it happened to Washington or to New York? You know damn well what you would do,” said Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, on American television. So the cycle has continued. Israeli bombs hit Hamas’s offices, rocket launchers and tunnel complexes. Several of the group’s commanders were killed. Israeli officers say they have significantly degraded Hamas’s capabilities. But even they don’t think the group will be down for long. When the next spark comes, the militants will undoubtedly be there to fan it.

And be in no doubt that it will come. Both sides are content to leave Gaza a festering pit of misery that periodically erupts. Hamas’s control in some ways suits Mr Netanyahu, inasmuch as it weakens the Palestinian leadership and dims the prospect of a Palestinian state. Israel will still try to keep the group down, though. It and Egypt have kept Gaza under blockade since 2007, making it harder for Hamas to arm itself—and making life grim for ordinary Gazans. Restrictions on travel mean they cannot leave. The isolated, impoverished territory draws comparisons to an open-air prison.

Hamas’s policies make it more like a shooting range. The group sometimes shows little interest in actually governing. Its schools and hospitals can be used for storing weapons. The idea is that Israel won’t attack such sites or, if it does, Hamas can use it for propaganda. The militants were surprised by how hard Israel hit back after they launched their first barrage on May 10th. Still, even as the death toll mounted, they did not stop.

Yet there were new elements to this round of violence. A wave of clashes between Jewish and Arab citizens in Israel itself unnerved Mr Netanyahu. There are new types of pressure from abroad, too. Whereas President Joe Biden emphasised “Israel’s legitimate right to defend itself”, some fellow Democrats called for putting conditions on American aid to Israel.

But for now, none of that is likely to stop the cycle of violence. Israel and Hamas will come out of this battle much as they went in. Nothing has been gained; nothing has been resolved. And yet they are likely to do it again.

Editor’s note (May 21st 2021): This article has been updated since publication, after the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas came into effect

By The Economist

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